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OBSERVATIONS

On the

LETTER

Written to

Sir *THOMAS OSBORN*,

Upon the Reading of a BOOK

called the

Present Interest

OF

ENGLAND

STATED.

Written in a Letter to a Friend.

LONDON,

Printed for *J. B. Anno Domini*, 1673.

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Obſervations, &c.

SIR,

SO ſoon as ſome indiſpencible occaſions would permit, I did at your inſtance, ſtrictly peruſe the *Pamphlet*, called *The preſent Intereſt of* England *ſtated*; as alſo, the *Letter* directed to Sir *Thomas Osborne* in anſwer to it, and at your requeſt, ſhall now give you my ſenſe of *both*.

I find no Cauſe by the ſcope of the *Letter*, to believe otherwiſe of the *Author*, then according to his own Profeſſions, that he really deſigns the *Honour*, *Greatneſs*, and *Proſperity* of this *Nation*. An Honeſt, and Honourable undertaking, the perfect diſcovery whereof, I wiſh may be purſued, by men of leaſure, and put in practice by thoſe of *Power*.

I underſtand the *Letter*, to agree fully with the *Pamphlet* in all its Maxims, relating to our *domeſtick Intereſt*, not differing neither from our *Forrein* in anything, ſave what relates to *Holland*, and therein likewiſe, not in *all*, but only in *ſome* particulars, but in *ſeveral* of them; I obſerve alſo the *Author* of the *Pamphlet*, to be by the *Letter* exceedingly miſta-

ken; for whereas *it* renders him so *Byassed* with *affection* to the *Dutch*, as makes him overlook the usefulness of *Forreign Alliances*. I [illegible] judge, but [illegible] all he writes concerning *Holland*, upon the *safety* and *benefit* of *England*, insomuch as it seems strange to me, how a person of that Ca[illegible] must be, sh[illegible] that the *Pamphlet* he answereth, pleadeth

First, *For allowing all the injuries and wrongs done by the* Hollanders *to this Nation*, (Page 5.)

Secondly, *For studying of their Interests, and loving of them, because they are Traders, though by being so, they take our Trade from us*, (Page 5, 6.)

And Thirdly, *That their Parsimonie is no good Reason for dislike of them*, (Page 6.) As if all these were Arguments made use of by express words in that *Book*, when I do not find any expressions relating to any of these particulars, that do either in words *say* so much, or will in the least *admit* of any such Inferences or Conclusions; (although as to this *Third*, if there were any word to that purpose, it might be defended) For all the *Arguments* made use of by the *Pamphlet*, against the destroying of the *Hollanders*, are either upon the account of *Justice* and *Righteousness*, (*which establisheth a Nation*) or clearly in reference to the *safety* and *utility* of this *Kingdom*, both in *Church* and *State*, and not in the least, upon any *particular affection* to the *people* of that *Countrey*, as the *Letter* doth insinuate the *Pamphlet*; being no otherwise concerned for them, then as it is, for preserving the Ballance of *Christendome*, in opposition of *Popery* and *Slavery*.

I find the *Pamphlets* commendning the *Dutch* for their *Morals*, (compared with the *French*, &c.) to be answered by objecting, that if the *Author* had lain but one night in any *Inn* of *theirs*, he would have been convinced of the contrary, which implyeth, that he had never done it, or at least ne-

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ver told the world he had, and yet the *Book* justifies his opinion of *them* in affirming his experience, from having travelled *their Countries*; (*Interest of England* Page 30.) and truly by his general knowledge of the *Netherlands*, he may well be supposed to have throughly done it, and granting so much, it consequently follows, that he must then have experienced their *Inns*, but if from *Cousening*, and *Cheating* in *Inns*, *Alehouses*, and *Taverns*, the measures of a *peoples Morals*, must be Calculated, I fear, some other *Countries*, by high *reckonings*, false *measures*, in *Bottles*, *Pots* and *Cans*; exceeding them, and tacitly allowed of, *&c.* will be found as faulty as they, and to lie (at least) equally with them, under the burden of that uncharitable *Synecdoche*, of blaming the whole for a part; for I can my self by experience, so far joyn with the *Pamphlet* in justifying of it, as to aver, That I never travelled in all my life, in any *Countrey* so cheap as in *theirs*, and that no private person doth otherwise, but either *voluntarily*, by being profuse, or *carelessly* in spending more then he needeth, in not keeping to his ordinaries, but living at large; for their *Rates* by *Land* or *Water*, are so certain, that none can pay one more then another, and the like is in *their Inns*, for *Ordinaries* and *Lodgings*; insomuch that I have often wondered their great *Trade* and *Populousness* (which in all other places makes things dear) considered, I found living there so cheap as I did. But as no number or society of men, can be said to be *perfectly good*, or *altogether evil*; so the most just and certain Rule for applauding, or condemning any *Countrey*, is not from *a few Instances* of a small part of it, but by way of *Comparison* with other *Countries*, and by that *Standard*, *Holland* cannot be found by much, so bad as *Popish Countries*, where the *Doctrines* of the *Jesuits* (which hath more or less an influence upon most of their *Religion*) of *good Intentions*, *Probability*, and *Necessity*, &c. and of their whole Church, of *keeping no*

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faith with Heriticks, &c. is inconsistent with honest Conversation, rendering them unfit, even for one anothers Society, there being no fence against such Principles.

The Cruelty at *Amboina*, is (I confess) to be had by all in abhorrence; but since it was *before* we were born, that it was acted but by *a few*, and disowned, and not justified *at home*. That *King James* of happy memory, and his wise and excellent Council, and Favourites, thought therefore not fit to *revenge* it; and that it hath since, by several treaties, been buried, and put in Oblivion; I question whether we ought still to *remember* it; but provided, that the constant Trade that the *Popish Nations* have (in all ages down to our times) driven in *Massacres*, and *Cruel Torterings*, and that with the applause, and approbation of their chief *Bishop* and *Church*, as *Italy*, *Savoy*, *France* and *Ireland* do witness, may be remembered; I can be well pleased, that that single Act at *Amboina*, committed by *a few Protestants* condemned by the rest, and which is abhorred by the *Principles of their Religion*, may not be forgotten; and thereupon the whole designs of the *Pamphlet* and *Letter*, each severally considered, I cannot observe, that they differ in any *Material* Circumstance, but that both aim at the same end, the *Honour*, *Greatness*, *Prosperity* and *Safety* of this *Nation*, unless the *first* is too straight laced in the Rules of Honesty and Justice; believing (that though Interest rightly understood or mistaken, governs all the world yet) that that precept of *doing to others, as we would have them to do to us*, gives no latitude to any *Country* to destroy *another*, to the end to increase their own *Trade*, or *greatness*; for were it otherwise, nothing could be more for our security against *Invasions*, and the profit of *England*, then to destroy in time the *French* in their Shipping, and thereby in their *Maritime Commerce*, before they are overgrown in *strength* and *Trade*, in both, which from young *Interlopers*, they are

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in a short time too much increased, especially in our *Newfoundland Fishery*, where they have almost eaten us out, to the unspeakable prejudice of the *Western Parts!* though *that Trade* was once our *greatest Nursery* for *Seamen*, and might have been much more *improved*, and is of such a *Nature*, as the *Dutch* were not capable of doing us much prejudice in, or at least as they never *attempted* to do us any.

The *Letter* reproves the *Pamphlets inviting all Princes into the triple League*, scoffing at it, as absurd; *the League being now determined*, and to evince the error, gives this account of the League: *That the* French King *being entered* Flanders, *with a very powerful Army, the* Kings of England, Sweden, *and the* States of Holland, *entered into a confederacy, with design to force the* French *to make peace upon such Terms as should be proposed by them*, (and therein wisely to prevent the growing greatness of *France*) *and at the same time the* Confederates *made* Articles *amongst themselves, to help one another, in Case any of them should be invaded for having made this League*) *either by the* French King, *the* King of Spain, *or any of their Allies, and upon the acceptance of the Articles proposed, the* Confederates *became their* Guarranty *or* Sureties; *for performance of them on both sides.*

And now, this being the state of the Case, where the Absurdity or Bull lies, in making no distinction between the *Triple League*, and the *Guaranty* of the Peace, is beyond my apprehension; for the *League*, as is confessed being made to induce (that is, to force) the *French King* to a Peace, (the *King of Spain*, who was Invaded, standing in no need of Compulsion) and the Confederacy continuing for warranting of the said agreement (which in effect is no less than an honest and prudent *League*, for keeping the *French*, within tollerable bounds and limits) and for the assistance of each other against any that should endeavour to revenge this confederacy; the *Triple League* seems to me (as it is confessed by the *Letter* it self, at the

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lower end of *Page* 15.) to be still in being, and the expression to be as properly used, as that of *Guarranty*, as being one and the same thing; for the *Guarranty*, aiming at the same end the *League* doth, and being one Article of the confederacy, the *Triple League* must be still in being, as well as the *Guarranty*; And surely, it was the last *Session of Parliament* thought so to be, when Money was desired for maintaining of it; but this, *Sir*, is not worth contending about; for the matter being clearly laid down by the *Letter*, the judgment of it is left to your self.

As I am no *Statist*, nor pretender to it, so it concerns not me to inquire further into the Articles agreed on by his Majesty with the *Swede* and *Dutch*, then is made publick, nor in the least to attempt the Censuring any Action of *State*; (for that shall always be Forreign to me) but yet I presume I may without offence say, it doth not appear to me, as it doth to the *Author* of the *Letter*, that the *Emperor* and *Princes* of *Germany*, could not have been taken into the *Triple League* by the *Confederates*, without ingaging to assist them upon occasion against the *Turk*; for as we find that it hath been ordinary for *Princes* to limit and proportion their *Leagues*, according to their *Interests*, so it is irrational to do otherwise; And it doth not follow, that because it is the *Interest* of the *Emperour*, and *Princes* of *Germany*, to enter into a *League* with other *Princes*, for keeping the *French King* from unjustly incroaching upon his *Neighbours*, that therefore those *Princes*, contrary to their manifest *Interest*, should enter into a *League* with them against the *Turk*; but I Honour the *Author* of the *Letter*, for the care he expresseth to have for the prevention of *War* to this *Nation*, and for the rest and quiet of the poor people of *England*, (Page 4.)

The *Pamphlet* not being concerned in the complaint against those that blame the breach with *Holland*, because of the *Triple League*, I shall pass that over, agreeing fully with

with the *Author*, that self-preservation is chiefly to be preferred, *salus Populi suprema lex*.

The *Author* of the *Letter*, in his treating of the *Interest of England*, hath several *Observations*, and *Notions*, deserving consideration, which I shall reduce to these six heads following.

First, *That our increase in power, since the time of* Queen Elizabeth, *(of famous memory) is not proportionable to the increase of the* Dutch, (*Page* 12.)

Secondly, *That the* Dutch, *being so powerful at Sea as they now are, may by joyning with the* French, *(whenever they will agree upon it) endanger the Conquest of* England; *and keeping to themselves the most considerable parts in it for Trade, being Masters at Sea, provide for their own security against the greatness of* France, (*Page* 12.)

Thirdly, *That it is not wisdom for any Nation to have its safety depend upon the prudence of another, as in relying upon its being against the* Interest of Holland *to Invade* England, *because they may mistake their Interest*, (Page 12.)

Fourthly, *That a Conquest of* England *being made, the* Dutch *Government being more easie and indulging Trade, then the Arbitrary and severe Regiment of* France, *as also their Religion concurring more with ours, then that of* France, *the Trading Party of* England *would be likelier to close with the first then the latter, and for the like Reason should* Holland *be ever in danger of a Conquest by the Conjunction of* England *with* France, *they would rather choose to become part of the* English *Government, then submit to the power of* France: *For that their joyning with us, and therein making it as much our Interest to promote their Trade, as the Trade of any other Nation, may answer that Objection,* That their fear of our obstructing their Trade, will make them averse to us, (*Page* 13.)

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Fifthly, *That it is not probable, that the* Dutch *will ever agree to put themselves under the Dominion of the* French, *who will not trust them without such advantages as may compel them to observe their promises, as the other will never give them such a power, least they should make a corrupt use of it.* (Page 14.)

Sixthly, *That considering the Situation and Constitutions of* England, *a Coalition with us would prove more acceptable and advantagious to them, then any tearms they can expect from the* French, *and that should we get no more then the* Maritine Towns, *and the* French *all the rest of the* States Dominions, *we should have no cause to repent our Bargain.* (Page 14.)

These *Notions* contain the substance of that part of the *Letter*, which treats of the *Interest of England*; the *first* of which I must not at present deny, because the *Auxiliary* assistance which we have received from *France*, seems to make it good; yet the *Story* of 88. acquaints us, that the *States* in those times with 35. *Men of War*, Blocked up *Dunkirk*, and the *Duke of Parma's Navy* in it, to the great service of *England*; but it is certain, that all *Nations* will increase, or decline more or less, according as their *Interest* is pursued, and their Government suited to it, which happily is the Cause why none can be said to have out-done the States of *Holland* (their low beginnings considered) in increase in *Trade* and *Riches*; but if augmentation in Territories, and power be a Crime, it is one that *France* is more guilty of then the *United Netherlands*, and ought therefore to be looked upon with a more jealous Eye: for the natural advantages that we have of the *Dutch* in the Situation of our *Country*, and the greatness of it; in the goodness and number of our *Havens* and *Ports*, to breed *Seamen*, and Harbour *Ships*, are such, as appears to me to render it impossible for them, ever to become our superiours at Sea (*as is suggested by the Letter*, Page 11.)

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As to the *second* assertion, or head, I must in that crave leave to dissent, without granting the question (which is begged) that *Holland*, whilst in liberty, might be under a likelyhood of agreeing with *France* for the Conquest of *England*, the thing seeming to me to be morally impossible.

First, From their want of *people*, especially fit for *War*, their *Dominions* being small, and furnished much with *Strangers*, and altogether with *Traders*, Circumstances which no *Countrey* must be under, that designs Forrein Conquests or Invasions.

Secondly, From the Nature of their *Government*, in its being no more then an *Union* of several *absolute Sovereignties*, for common defence and preservation, which is a quality not fit for acquisitions, in that the difficulty in satisfying every concern upon the good success of their Arms, and the many occasions that would arise from thence of differences amongst them, renders it impracticable.

Thirdly, From the impossibility of the *French*, and their *agreement upon the Division of England*; for that it is not to be imagined, but each of them would be jealous of the others *increase in Territories and Power*, and that the States would have no more cause to presume upon their overwitting the *French*, in getting to themselves the most considerable places in it for *Trade*, (as is supposed by the *Letter* Page 12.) then the *French* in over-reaching *them*, who have always been wise enough in *Treaties*; For that an increase in the *French Monarchy* would be more dangerous to the *States*, then the like in the *States* would be to *them*, who are already the others overmatch, and it cannot with reason but be supposed, that in the *Division of England*, the *French* would on the one hand have an Eye at supplying themselves with that they only want, for making them uncontrollable in the world, *good Havens* and *Ports*, and also on the other

hand, that the *Dutch* would never yield unto that, that would *destroy them*. But if *England* had reason to be jealous of *France* and *Holland's* Conjunction, in order to the Conquest of it: (as the Letter suggests) I fear with the same reason *France* will be jealous of *England's* impatronizing *Holland*, as being as well unwilling to have the *Dominion of the Sea* so much *undivided* in the hands of any *one* Lord, as all the rest of *Europe* cannot check it, as *we* are to have the *Dominion of the Land* in the like kind under any other Lord or Prince.

To the *Third* ascertion, I have not any thing to object in opposition, nothing being more ordinary in the world then *gross mistakes* in the *Interest* of Countries, proceeding often from *passion*, *revenge*, and *disordered affections*; yet *this* may be said in the Case, that the *States* were such great Masters in the knowledge of their civil Interests, that *none* might have been *safelier* trusted upon that account then *they*.

To the *Fourth head* or assertion, I have only this to answer, that as it is natural for all Rational Creatures, of *two* evils to choose the *least*, so supposing, that the *States* being reduced to a necessity of parting with their own Government, *will have the Election* of their *new* Lords in their own *power*; and taking it for granted, that they are men of some *Conscience* and *Religion*, (though some *deny* them to be so) I do fully agree with the *Author* of the *Letter* in his opinion, that they will in such Case choose rather the *English*, then the severe Government of the *French*, unless the consideration (in their partial opinion) of who is best able to protect their Country, do not prevail with them, to *trust* the *French* King in point of *Religion*; but I very much question, whether it is not groundless to suppose, that any Nation being attacked by *two* great *Monarchs*, *will have* the *choice* of their own Masters left to *themselves*, by a *mutual agreement* betwixt those Monarchs, without which it cannot be; but I highly esteem the *Author* of

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the *Letter*, for the true ſenſe he expreſſeth to have of the *French* Government, from which the *Lord in Mercy deliver all other Countries*.

The *Fifth* aſſertion, is a ſuppoſition that the *Dutch* will have it in their *choice*, to truſt the *French* or not, and in *ſuch* Caſe I am of opinion with the *Letter*, that they will never do it, *Spain*, *Lorrain*, and the *Proteſtants* of *France*, being a ſufficient *warning* to them; but as Affairs now ſtand, I very much fear they will not have the *Election* of it in their own hands.

The *Sixth* aſſertion, though as moſt *Weighty*, deſerveth moſt *Conſideration*; yet for the *firſt* part of it, whether *England* admitting the *Dutch* to a *Coalition*, would be of more advantage to them then any tearms they can expect from the *French*. I will not diſpute, but am much of belief, that the *French* Councils, conſidering that they want nothing to facilitate their *univerſal* deſign more then an Intereſt in the *Northern* Seas, where they might Harbour, and form an *Navy*, nouriſh and breed *Seamen*, and likewiſe conſidering, that the Maritime Towns of *Holland*, *Zealand* and *Friezland*, would ſignifie nothing without *Trade*; but in danger of being ſwallowed up by the *Sea*, for want of ability to maintain the *Banks* againſt it, nor *Trade* ſignifie any thing without liberty, they would ſoon find it neceſſary as to their Intereſt, to wave the *French* Principles for *arbitrary* Government, and to leave the *Dutch* in a great meaſure of *freedom*, relying only upon *Cittadels*, for keeping them dependant upon them, and forcing them upon occaſion to be uſeful to them, as judging *that* the beſt way to ſerve themſelves of them, leaſt otherwiſe by *ſeverity*, they ſhould provoke the *diſperſing* the Inhabitants to *Emden*, *Bremen*, *Hambourg*, *Lubeck* and *Dantzic*, &c. the four firſt being *Imperial Free* Cities, and the latter the *ſame* under *Poland*

Poland; for *arbitrary* Government, (that must be maintained by the Sword) and the idle Callings and rude manners of *Souldiers*, which are altogether inconsistant with, and *Enemies* to *Trade* and *Commerce*, will always cause Traders to change *bondage* for *liberty*, or at least in hopes of better entertainment one *Countrey* for another, as did the subversion of the *Florentine* Government in *that* Countrey; and as they were preparing to do the like in *Holland*, when they feared the late *Prince* of *Oreng's* over-turning *that* State, for the *Antipathy* betwixt *Merchants* and *Souldiers* is such, that all Monarchs of *Trading* Countries have ever held it their Interest, to keep their great *Trading Towns* free from a *Mercinary Militia*, and it is exceeding difficult, if not Morally impossible for a Prince to advance *Trade* to any great *height*, where the people are under the awe of a standing *Military* power; and the *French King* seems to own the *truth* of *this*, in that finding the benefit of Commerce, he is even in *France* content that his *Trading* Cities should be freed from *Souldiers*, and more gently used then the *rest* of his Countrey; for so far as the Nature of his *arbitrary* Government will permit, he studieth all manner of wayes to advance *Trade*.

As *first*, by totally prohibiting such *Forrein Commodities*, and *Manufactures*, as his people are capable of *making*, sufficient to serve his Countrey, as *Train-Oyl*, &c.

Secondly, By burthening *others* with high *Customs* and *Impositions*, to the end to incourage his *own* Artisans and Seamen, thereby making the Trade of *England* thither very prejudicial to us, our *Transportations* hence being inconsiderable to our *Importations* thence, and as they *improve* in any faculty, so they either *prohibit* or *increase* their impositions, upon the Importation of the Forrein-made Commodities of that faculty.

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And *Thirdly*, as an incouragement to Trade, the *French* King hath lately declared the exercise of Commerce in a *Gentleman*, to be no prejudice to his *quality*, having also erected an *Academy* for breeding his *Nobility* to *Sea* Affairs, and teaching them the Art of *Navigation*, &c. All which may well Alarm *England* to a *jealousie* of their designs as most dangerous to it, and to look upon the *French*, as those Rivals, whom (if hatred be *lawful*, as the *Letter* in this Case seems to make it) we ought most to hate; for should they once come to *Vie* with us in *Trade* or *Naval* strength, we should find them to exceed all that ever went before them, in *insolency*, *injustice*, and *selfishness*.

And whether the second part of this Notion hath a good *foundation*, which asserts, *That should* England *get but the* Sea Towns *alone, leaving the* rest *of the* States Dominions, *to the* French, *we should have no cause to repent our Bargain*. I will not presume to *judge*, yet *this* I think *considerable* in the Case, that should the *Inlands* of the *United Provinces*, and with them all the *Conquered places* fall to the share of the *French*, as by the late published *Proposals* in *Dutch* (if true) they seem to pretend unto the *Latter*; then having thereby the command of the Rivers of *Rhine* and *Mose*, &c. together with *Sluce*, and the other Garrisons which shuts up the Trade of *Flanders* and *Brabant*, they will have it in their power to render all the parts of the Seventeen Provinces, which will remain to the Kings of *England* and *Spain* of no more *use* to them, then they please to *allow* of.

First, Because the *Sea Towns* of the *United Netherlands*, cannot be divided from the *Inlands*, from which they receive their *nourishment*, nor deprived of the use of their *Rivers*, by which they drive their *Trades* without utter *ruine* to them, and making them thereby an intollerable *burthen* to their *Masters*.

Secondly,

Secondly, Because the *Spanish Netherlands* will thereby be so invironed, or rather be leagured by the *French* Garrisons and Forces on all sides, as well towards *Germany*, *Holland*, and *Zealand*, &c. as towards *France*, that having no means left them, for forming or maintaining an Army, (as any that know those Countries must confess) they will always be in the *French Kings* devotion, and when assaulted by him, without possibility of contributing any considerable assistance to their own *deliverance*, or to make the *Triple League* of any use to them.

Thirdly, Because such will be the enervated condition of the *Spanish Netherlands*, that the King of *Spain* will be necessitated, as not being able to *maintain* them longer then the *French* will *permit* him, either to quit them voluntarily, or (if he can obtain so much *favour*) to make an exchange or sale of them to the *French* King, who then having *Flanders* and *Brabant*, (which he hath so long thirsted after) and all the *Rivers* belonging to them in his own hands, will assuredly for the advantage of *himself*, and his *own Countries* even in times of *peace*, so *obstruct* and *hinder* the Trade of the Maritime Towns of *Holland*, *Zealand* and *Friezland*, (if in the possession of any but himself) and in times of *War* totally *shut* them up by Land) as will restore *Flanders* and *Brabant* to their *antient* Trade, and make a new *Holland* of them, which being in the hands of the *French*, will probably prove abundantly worse to *England* then the old, if large *experience* of injuries and injustices, committed in Trade by them against this Nation, may warrant a Conclusion, as by the Certificate under the Lord Ambassador *Hollis* his hand, (which I send you here inclosed) given upon an order of his Majesties Privy Council, Dated the 17. *April* 1667. in the Case of Sir *Francis Toppe*, and Company, doth for one instance sufficiently appear.

Nay

Nay, such is the *envious* care of the *French*, that no Nation should *get* or *thrive* by *them*, that (as Mr. *Samuel Fortrey*, one of the Gentlemen of his Majesties *Privy Chamber*, reporteth in his Book Printed 1663. and Dedicated to *King Charles the second*) not many years ago, they suspecting (through mistakes) that *England* had an advantage of them in their Trade for *France*, they were upon Counsels for *prohibiting* all Trade with *England*, until upon a strict examination, they found, that whereas *England* vented of their Commodities into *France*, not to above the value of *Ten hundred thousand Pounds per annum*; *France* vented of theirs to the *English Six and twenty hundred thousand pounds*; and then finding that they had *Sixteen hundred thousand Pounds* advantage in the Ballance, they soon let fall their design, though yet not without *burthening English* Manufactures with *New Impositions*, in such manner, as might much hinder the vent of them in their Countrey. And Mr. *Fortrey* in the aforementioned *Book*, doth not only recite the very *Ballance of Trade* it self, which he affirms was presented to the *French* King, to shew the advantage they have in their Trade with *England*; but also *adds* further, that hereby it may appear, how insensibly our *Treasure* will be *exhausted*, and the Nation *beggered*, whilst *we* carelessly neglect our own Interest, and *strangers abroad* are diligent to make their advantage by us.

And it is of no *little* consideration, that the *French* should so far *overvalue* themselves, as to increase their Impositions upon *Dutch* Commodities, to a degree of *prohibiting* them, and deny to the *Dutch* the like power by *theirs*, as if they had a right to deal as they please towards *other Nations*, and yet none to do towards them (by way of Retaliation) any more then *they* shall think fit to give them *leave* to do, an overweening opinion of their own *greatness*,

which all *Princes* and *States* ought to be *jealous* of, as not knowing where their ambition will end.

And besides *these* things thus instanced in, we have great cause to take notice, that as the effect of the implacable *hatred* of the *French* to our Nation, they cannot forbear in their *writings* to express their *inveterate malice* against us, as that Book called *le Politique de France*, writ in the year 1669. and Dedicated to the *French* King, is a pregnant Testimony, where no *better Epithetes* are allowed us, then being *without friends*, *without faith*, *without Religion*, *without honesty*, *without any justice*, of *defying* or *provoking Natures*, *light* or *unconstant to the highest degree*, *cruel*, *impatient*, *gluttons*, *proud*, *audatious and covetous*, *proper for ready execution and assaults*; *but uncapable of managing a War with judgment*, with other such like opprobrious and reproachful expressions, besides a Method propounded to be observed in order to the Conquest of *England*, Page 158, 159, 160, 161. enough to raise a lawful *indignation* in all true *Englishmen*, against such *insolent* slanderers, who by their impudence, endeavour to impose *their own* Characters upon *us*, contrary to the known experience of the rest of the world.

And now Sir I have no more to add then (all Circumstances considered) my agreement with the *Pamphlet* in this Principle, that while *France* is so *great* as at present, it can in no kind be for the *safety* of *England* to subvert *Holland* and *Zealand*, &c. which are properly called their *out-guards* or *works* against all Invasions, and cannot be *demolished*, or in the hands of the *French*, without laying *England naked*, or at least the more *open* to that Nation, and that nothing is more demonstrable, then that since the *United Provinces* cannot signifie much without *freedom*, they will under their own Government be of *most* use to all *Christendome*, (save *France*, who only wants them as a qualification for *threatning*, instead of courting their Neighbours,) in maintaining the

general

general Ballance of *Europe*, even as it was great wisdom in the *long Parliament* (for *the wickedest of men may have worldly prudence*) to joyn with *Holland* in the preserving of *Denmark*, as necessary for the Ballancing of *Sweden*, when *Cromwel* (in his time) in revenge of manifest affronts, and *hatred* had designed the ruine of the *Dane*.

And thus Sir, having in obedience to your Commands, given you freely my sense of the *Pamphlet* and *Letter*, without varying from the *matter* in *either*; as it is in them respectively stated, I hope you will pardon any thing wherein I may *differ* with you in *judgment* or *opinion*; for I have this for my *Buckler*, that what I have writ is *Truth*, and that I aim at nothing in it, but the true *Interest* of the *King* and *Kingdom* of *England*, and *Protestant* Religion, denying that any can have more Cordial affection for them, then my self, who am *&c.*

April 17th. anno 1669. According to the Printed Copy.

IN *obedience to an Order of Council of the 16th. present, requiring my opinion, what is fit to be done for relief of Sir* Francis Toppe *and Company. I do humbly certifie, that I have perused their Case, and find that they complain of great losses, and damages, sustained in the year* 1644. *whilst they lived in St.* Malo, *from the* French, *by seizing their Goods in a time of Peace, in the very* Harbours *of* France, *whither they had brought those Goods in a way of Trading, and where by several Treaties then in force, and by the very Law of Nations, (which gives a security to the Persons and Estates of all, who reside peaceably within the Dominions of any Prince or State) they ought to have been safe and free from all Arrests, the owners not having done any thing whereby to forfeit their Interest in them; which course, if suffered, must needs be the destruction of all Trade and Commerce, between the two Kingdoms, as it is also very dishonourable, and injurious to his Majesty, that the publick faith should be broken to his Subjects, who*

Trade

Trade under his protection, by vertue of the Treaties made between the two Crowns; and it is much to be feared, that the proceedings in France *may become very prejudicial in this kind to the whole trading of the* English *Nation in that Kingdom, if nothing be done to ſtop this growing miſchief. In regard this is not the ſingle Caſe, where this courſe hath been put in practice, the like having been done ſeveral times to* English *Merchants at* Rouen, *who are not yet free of the trouble; for a Capture at Sea, whether real, or pretended to have been made in* 1616. *by an* English *Privateer of a* French *Ship, belonging to one* Delaunay, *valued but at ſix thouſand Livers. And whilſt I had the Honour to ſerve his Majeſty, as his Ambaſſador in* France, *two* English *Ships coming into Harbour at* Marſeille, *when they had Landed their Goods, and paid all duties, were ſeized upon, Ships and Goods, and notwithſtanding all my ſolicitations, would not be diſcharged: But ſome Months after, the War breaking out, were given to the* East India *Company there, they pretending ſome Ships of theirs, to have been formerly taken by the* English. *And now as I hear at St.* John de Luz, *the ſame uſage is threatned, if not already begun to our Merchants there, for the reparation of the Widow* de Lazin, *for ſome goods of her late Husbands, taken from her by the*

Parliament

Parliament in 1643. So as all this makes me fearful it may come to be a constant Custom, if not prevented. I do therefore offer it as my humble opinion, that all care should be taken for the prevention of it. And for this particular Case of Sir Francis Topp's *and Company, that in the first place a fair application may be made to the* French *King, as well by his Ambassador here, as by his Majesties Ambassador at* Paris, *for the just satisfaction of the Petitioners, which may be hoped will prove effectual, and should it not, it will then be time for his Majesty to consider, what is further to be done for the vindication, of his own Honour, and and the protection of his Subjects.*

Hollis.

FINIS.